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NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE PIPELINE:
CONFUSION SURROUNDS LEGISLATIVE COURTS
Maryellen Fullerton*
In June 1982 the United States Supreme Court plunged into
one of the more arcane, yet politically volatile, areas of constitu-
tional law, and explored the limits on Congress' power to estab-
lish federal courts under article I of the United States Constitu-
tion.1 In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co.,2 the Court declared that the jurisdictional provi-
sions3 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code)4 consti-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
U.S. CONST. art. 1. Article I, which specifies the powers of Congres make no
reference to "legislative courts." "The power given Congress in Art. I § 8, cl. 9 'to consti-
tute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court', plainly relates to the 'inferior Courts' pro-
vided for in Art. III, § 1; it has never been relied on for establishment of any other
tribunals." Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 630, 643 (1962). Nevertheless, relying on its in-
herent power under article I, Congress has acted on a number of occasions to establish
"legislative courts," which are not part of the judicial branch of the federal government
The Supreme Court first recognized this power in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), which upheld the creation of territorial courts that were not
part of the independent federal judiciary created by article E
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited.
They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue
of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue
of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regula-
tions, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
26 U.S. at 546. See generally Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
The terms "article I court" and "legislative court" are generally used interchange-
ably. Some commentators identify two separate types of article I courts: legislative
courts and administrative agencies. ML RamisH, FEDRAL JUISuIcror. TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDicIAL PowER 36 (1980). In this article, the term "legislative courts"
will be considered synonymous with "article I courts," and will refer to all systems of
adjudication that Congress establishes, but does not endow with the guarantees of judi-
cial independence specified in article II.
2 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
3 The federal bankruptcy courts were given jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings
arising under title 11 (the Bankruptcy Title of the United States Code] or arising in or
related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. MI 1979).
4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code), Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IL 92
Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (Supp. I 1979)),
established a United States bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to
the district court.
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tute a delegation of judicial power5 in violation of article III of
the Constitution.6 With this decision, the Court ventured into
terrain aptly described as "a most difficult area of constitutional
law," in which "the precedents are horribly murky, doctrinal
confusion abounds, and the constitutional text is by no means
clear." 7
Although the Marathon decision was eagerly awaited and
its potential importance well-recognized, many were hesitant to
predict its outcome. The Supreme Court's contradictory pro-
nouncements during the past 150 years' concerning the constitu-
tionality of federal courts established under article I had left in
disarray the theoretical justification for Congress' power to es-
tablish courts with judges of limited tenure. As a result, com-
mentators, practitioners, and judges developed widely differing
' 102 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
6 Article III provides, in part-
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser-
vices, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
I H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-72, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNO.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 6030-32 (letter from Thomas G. Krattenmaker) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT with page citations to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
a The early opinion by Chief Justice Marshall concerning territorial courts, Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), adopted a clear-cut distinction: article
I courts could only consider article III subject matter, and article I courts could not
consider article III subject matter. Id. at 542-46. Although ignored by the Canter opin-
ion, two major flaws in this reasoning are apparent. First, the article I territorial court in
Canter exercised jurisdiction over an admiralty case, one of the categories of subject
matter jurisdiction expressly listed in article I, id. at 545, and this exercise of jurisdic-
tion was upheld by the Court, id. at 546. Second, in Canter, the Supreme Court, itself an
article I court, reviewed the territorial court's decision. Id. at 541. As the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited by article III, the controversy heard by
the territorial court must have fallen within the boundaries set by article III. Thus, even
the early approaches to this problem, though drawing clear dichotomies, were muddled.
The Supreme Court decided in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and in
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), that the Court of Customs Appeals and
the Court of Claims, respectively, were legislative rather than article III courts. In Bake-
lite, the Court assumed that there was an extensive overlap between the jurisdiction of
article I and article III courts, 279 U.S. at 450-51, while four years later in Williams the
Court indicated that no article I court could resolve any disputes falling within the arti-
cle I subject-matter. 289 U.S. at 578-79. Both Bakelite and Williams were overturned
by a plurality of the Court in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 584 (1962). See note 15
infra.
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views on the constitutionality of the new system of bankruptcy
courts." Asked whether legislative bankruptcy courts would be
constitutional, Charles Alan Wright responded: "The metaphys-
ics of what is the judicial power of the United States that, under
Article III, can only be exercised by [courts guaranteed life ten-
ure and irreducible salaries] are extremely complex and... no
one can give an answer with any assurance until the Supreme
Court has spoken."'"
Unfortunately, Marathon did little to resolve this confusion.
The Supreme Court produced four separate opinions: Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan in the
plurality opinion;1' Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor filed a con-
curring opinion;12 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell, wrote a lengthy and biting dissent; 3 and,
Chief Justice Burger added a short dissent of his own.' 4 These
opinions are so contradictory that no one can safely predict the
Court's ruling on future cases involving article I federal courts.
Furthermore, the major opinions filed by Justices Brennan and
White each so exposes inconsistencies and flaws in the other
that neither approach appears satisfactory. Only one thing is
clear: the Supreme Court has had - and continues to have -
great difficulty in formulating a coherent analytic framework in
this area. This is demonstrated by the frequency with which the
Court has issued multiple and wildly varying opinions when ex-
amining the constitutionality of article I courts.15 The Marathon
9 See HousE REPoirr, supra note 7, at 6025-49 (letters addressed to Representative
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of House Judiciary Committee, commenting on constitu-
tionality of pending bankruptcy legislation).
10 Id. at 6048.
21 102 S. CL at 2862-80.
" Id. at 2880-82.
Is Id. at 2882-96.
14 Id. at 2882.
15 For example, in National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949),
Justice Jackson, writing for a plurality of three, upheld the federal statute granting arti-
cle III courts jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of a state and citizens of the
District of Columbia. Acknowledging that such a suit did not fall within the diversity
jurisdiction outlined by the Constitution, the plurality ruled that Congress could azsign a
non-article III matter to an article m court so long as the assignment was necessary to
carry out its duties under article L See 337 U.S. at 583-604. Justices Rutledge and Mur-
phy concurred, but expressly rejected the plurality's analysis, concluding that the diver-
sity grant included suits brought by citizens of the District against citizens of the state3.
Id. at 604-26. Two dissents were filed, one by Justices Vinson and Douglas, id. at 626-46,
the other by Justices Frankfurter and Reed, id. at 646-55. Both dissenting opinions re-
1993]
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decision, with no single analytical approach garnering majority
support, falls squarely into this pattern.
This article reviews the constitutional principles involved,
the statutory scheme that ran afoul of these principles, and the
differing analyses advanced in the opinions. Focusing on the
constitutional plan to ensure judicial independence, it then iden-
tifies the major shortcomings of these analyses. Finally, this arti-
cle explores some of the political implications the Marathon
opinions may have for proposed legislation to curtail the juris-
diction of the federal courts."'
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution establishes the judi-
cial branch of the national government.17 It has long been inter-
preted to guarantee that members of the judicial branch enjoy
life tenure,18 and it expressly prohibits the reduction of judges'
salaries during their terms of office.19 These requirements were
established to ensure the independence of federal judges from
pressure from the electorate or from the legislative or executive
branches.20 As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist
jected the plurality's view that article I1 courts can adjudicate controversies falling be-
yond those listed in article I. Id. at 627-54. Justice Frankfurter, furthermore, disagreed
with the concurrence's view that District of Columbia citizens are state citizens for pur-
poses of the diversity grant. Id. at 654. Thus, although a majority of the Court agreed
that article I subject matter was not assignable to an article III court, jurisdiction was
nonetheless upheld.
In Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), Justice Harlan, writing for a plurality of
three, held that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were
article III courts, 370 U.S. at 581-85, thus overruling the Bakelite and Williams cases,
see note 8 supra. Justices Clark and Warren concurred, but found it unnecessary to
overrule Bakelite or Williams because of intervening changes in the jurisdiction of the
courts. Id. at 585-89. Justices Douglas and Black dissented, stressing that the judges who
had been appointed to article I courts had not been selected with an eye to the skills and
qualifications necessary for an article III court judge. Id. at 589-606.
11 See, e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (limiting jurisdiction of Supreme
Court and district courts in cases arising out of any state statute relating to abortion);
H.R. 326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts in cases
relating to school prayer); H.R. 2347, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (same); H.R. 340, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts in cases relating to school
desegregation).
17 See note 6 supra.
IS See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
i* See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218-21 (1980); note 6 supra.
10 See Will, 449 U.S. at 217-18.
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Papers:
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever
made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts'] necessary
independence. If the power of making them was committed either to
the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper
complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would
be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either, if to the peo-
ple, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would
be too great a disposition to consult popularity to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the Laws.'
In Hamilton's view, "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed
provision for their support. .... In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power
over his will."22
What Hamilton does not explain, however, is why judicial
independence is necessary. It appears that the framers sought to
further two goals. First, judicial independence would benefit liti-
gants in federal courts by providing them with an impartial deci-
sionmaker.2 s Second, and more importantly, the framers sought
to ensure that the national government would not degenerate
into tyranny.24 It was accepted political theory in the United
States at the time of the constitutional convention that the con-
centration of power in one branch of government would lead to
the tyrannical exercise of power by that branch.25 Judicial inde-
pendence was seen as a powerful restraint against such
21 THE FEDERmisT No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
"Tax FEDEALIsT No. 79, at 472 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rositer ed. 1961).
" See Marathon, 102 S. Ct. at 2864-65 ("The Federal Judiciary was therefore
designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Executive and Legislature... to
guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impartial...").
24 THE FEDE.AS No. 47, at 300-08 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
2See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers", 2
U. Cm. L. REv. 385, 394-419 (1935). In fact, at the time of the constitutional convention,
a majority of state constitutions embodied the separation of powers principle. See id. at
419. As Madison observed:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that... (t]he ac-
cumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
THE F :ErAs No. 47, supra note 24, at 301.
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concentration.28
A. The Doctrines of Separation of Powers and of Checks and
Balances
This function of judicial independence plays an important
role in the overall constitutional structure. The framers incorpo-
rated two distinct, but complementary, structural devices to en-
sure that excessive power would not be exercised by any one
branch of the proposed government. First, the framers divided
the functions of the new government into three separate
branches, and enumerated the powers of each branch. This has
become known as the separation of powers doctrine. Under this
scheme, the judicial power was to be exercised only by courts
established under article 111.28 Since experience with the state
constitutions had taught that separation of powers alone would
not prevent an unhealthy concentration of power if one branch
were able to exert controlling influence over another,2 the fram-
ers also provided each branch with mechanisms to deter en-
croachment by one branch upon the functions of another. The
article III guarantees of life tenure and irreducible salary to-
gether provide one of the judiciary's protections against such en-
croachment.30 By ensuring the independence of the courts the
Constitution restricts the ability of the other branches to influ-
ence the judges and thus effectively exercise judicial power.
Second, in addition to the theory of separation of powers,ai
the framers incorporated the distinct but complementary theory
of checks and balances between government departments into
the constitutional structure.2 The checks and balances proposal,
which permitted the branches of the federal government to
" See THE FEDERALisT No. 78, supra note 21.
2 The Constitution defines the powers granted to each of the three branches of
government. See U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative branch); id. art. II (executive branch); id.
art. I (judicial branch).
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 24; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-27 (1978).
"S See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 24, at 303-08.
10 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 21, at 469-72.
Si The separation of powers doctrine is of ancient lineage. It appears first in Aris-
totle's The Politics, but its modern development began with John Locke's observations
on the struggles between the Stuart Kings and Commons. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 126; Sharp, supra note 25, at 387.
31 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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check the activities of their sister branches, was controversial.
Many believed that a government in which each branch was
granted precisely delineated, compartmentalized powers-a gov-
ernment of separated powers-would suffice to prevent a dan-
gerous consolidation of power in any one department 3 Others
advanced the view that there should be an overlapping of func-
tions. Those taking the latter position contended that a system
that entrusted discrete powers to more than one branch of the
government would enable each branch to check the excesses of
the other. Accordingly, they advocated that the federal consti-
tution contain a system of checks and balances as well as a
structure of divided functions.3 5 The latter view prevailed; the
drafters of the Constitution devised a government of three sepa-
rate, but interdependent, branches. Under this scheme, the judi-
ciary is empowered to check the other branches by reviewing
government action and determining whether such action violates
the Constitution. 6 The power to invalidate governmental action
provides the judiciary its second great protection against en-
croachment from coordinate branches, for if the political depart-
ments intrude into the judicial domain, courts can declare such
action unconstitutional. Here again, the constitutional mecha-
nisms guaranteeing judicial independence are necessary; it is un-
likely that the checks and balances available to the judiciary
would actually be exercised if the courts were dependent on the
other branches. 7
Thus, life tenure and irreducible salaries further both the
separation of powers and the checks and balances policies. With-
out judicial independence, the influence of other branches on ju-
dicial decisions could result in the exercise of judicial power by a
nonjudicial branch and in a judiciary unwilling to employ its
check. For these reasons, the Constitution "unambiguously
enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of
the United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary.
It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously
"Madison authored THE F .ERALmS No. 47 in order to counter such a view.
See Sharp, supra note 25, at 422-34.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 32, at 308-13; Sharp, supra note 25, at
422-34.
sThe power of the judiciary to review the actions of the other branche3 was made
explicit in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
7See THE FEDERALrsT No. 78, supra note 21, at 466.
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guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that
independence."38
Unfortunately, the concepts of separation of powers and of
checks and balances are often regarded as synonymous.30 This
confusion is understandable, as both concepts arose out of strug-
gles against tyranny' 0 and constitute political solutions intended
to prevent the consolidation of power in one branch of govern-
ment. Nonetheless, as described above, the systems of separa-
tion of powers and of checks and balances perform quite differ-
ent functions.
The distinction is of more than theoretical significance. Al-
though applying both concepts to a set of facts often leads to the
same result, it does not always do so. For example, under a sepa-
ration of powers analysis, the salient inquiry is only whether one
branch of government has performed a function assigned to an-
other branch. Under a checks and balances analysis, the salient
inquiry is whether a government action undermines a branch's
ability to restrain its co-equal branches. Accordingly, the consti-
tutionality of a particular governmental action may vary, de-
pending upon whether it is evaluated from the point of view of
separation of powers or of checks and balances.
B. Legislative Courts
Generally, Congress has observed the need for judicial inde-
pendence and has assigned judicial matters to article III courts.
The first Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1789,41 established
federal district and circuit courts under article 111.42 The judges
of these courts then, as now, were guaranteed life tenure and
Marathon, 102 S. Ct. at 2866.
See J. NowAI, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 126-27.
4o The modem development of the separation of powers doctrine began with John
Locke's concern with the struggles for power between the Stuart Kings and Commons. In
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 and 48, the principle of checks and balances was identified as a
further attempt to protect against the consolidation of power in one organ of govern-
ment. At the time of the constitutional convention, the possibility of tyranny by the
legislative branch, in particular, was greatly feared. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note
32.
4, See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
42 Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 9. Acting under this provision
Congress has established the inferior courts referred to in article III. See Glidden v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1962).
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irreducible salaries during their appointments.43 But Congress
has also established tribunals staffed by judges who serve with-
out these article III protections." These tribunals are commonly
referred to as "article I" or "legislative" courts. 5
Some legislative courts have been challenged as unconstitu-
tional on the basis that they lack the guarantees of judicial inde-
pendence, yet exercise judicial power. Although there is no tex-
tual support in the Constitution for the creation of legislative
courts,46 a number of Supreme Court decisions have recognized
circumstances in which article I grants Congress this power.47 In
fact, the Court generally has upheld grants of jurisdiction to leg-
islative courts, thus, in effect, ruling that the guarantees of judi-
cial independence are not always necessary. Unfortunately, be-
cause the Court's reasoning in this area has been unclear and
often contradictory," it is nearly impossible to determine the
limits upon Congress' power to dispense with the constitutional
guarantees of life tenure and irreducible salaries.
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 44(b) (1976) (guaranteeing continued tenure for circuit judges
during good behavior); id. § 134(a) (guaranteeing continued tenure for district judges
during good behavior); id. §§ 44(d), 135, 461(b) (collectively guaranteeing irreducible sal-
aries for district and circuit judges).
" Congress has established the following article I courts. territorial courts, see
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828); consular courts, see In re Ross, 140 US.
453 (1891); courts in unincorporated districts outside the United States, see Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); military courts, see Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955);
private land claims courts, see United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894); Indian citizen-
ship courts, see Stevens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); the District of Colum-
bia courts, see Palmore v. United States, 411 US. 389 (1973); the Tax Court, see Stix
Friedman & Co., Inc. v. Coyle, 463 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1972); and the Court of Claim.
Although the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were ini-
tially established as article I courts, see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531 (1961),
Congress later enacted legislation declaring them to be article I courts. See Act of Aug.
25,1958, § 1, 72 Stat. 848 (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); Act of July 28,1953, §
1, 67 Stat. 226 (Court of Claims). However, in 1982, Congress reversed directions and
established the Court of Claims as an article I court. See Act of Apr. 2,1982, Pub. L. No.
97-164, tit. I, § 105(a). The same legislation replaced the article I Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals with the article I Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (Supp. V 1982).
" Many distinguish between "legislative" and "constitutional" courts. See note 1
supra.
"The power given to Congress to "constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, has been interpreted as referring solely to the con-
gressional power to create article I courts. See note 1 supra.
7 See note 44 supra.
" See note 15 and accompanying text supra. See generally M. REDisH, supra note
1, at 35-51.
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The existence of legislative courts raises problems of great
political significance. Absent limits on Congress' power to assign
judicial matters to legislative courts, Congress can easily circum-
vent the constitutional design of a tripartite government. More-
over, unless there are limits on the creation of legislative courts,
Congress can undermine the impartiality of federal adjudication
by assigning controversial matters to judges who are not insu-
lated from political pressure.
Since assigning matters to legislative courts rather than to
article III courts in effect would curtail the jurisdiction of article
III courts, the limits on legislative courts are of particular im-
portance today. Although Congress generally has acted in a non-
partisan fashion in creating legislative courts, 9 modern efforts to
limit the jurisdiction of article III courts, currently the subject of
heated political debate,50 cast doubt on Congress' impartiality. It
is now plausible to envision partisan efforts to withdraw certain
matters from article III courts and to assign them to courts
staffed by judges whose salaries and terms of appointment can
be changed at Congress' whim. Thus, the creation of federal
courts lacking these guarantees raises fundamental questions
about the balance of power in our constitutional structure of
three independent, co-equal branches.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE
In order to evaluate the Marathon opinions, the history of
the bankruptcy courts must be viewed in the context of the con-
stitutional framework. Existing bankruptcy law51 was amended
in 1938 by the Chandler Act, which significantly altered the ad-
judication of bankruptcy disputes.52 Under the Chandler Act
bankruptcy matters were heard either by federal district courts
" None of the prior cases reviewing the constitutionality of article I courts suggests
that Congress created these courts in an attempt to appease any political faction or
group. See, e.g., Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 533 (1933); Ex Porte Bakelite Corp., 379 U.S. 438 (1929); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
80 See note 16 supra.
' In 1898, Congress prescribed substantive law for bankruptcies and established a
judicial framework to resolve bankruptcy disputes. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544.
82 See House R-EPORT, supra note 7, at 5970.
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or by bankruptcy referees . 3 Bankruptcy referees were appointed
by federal district judges for six-year terms,5 and their decisions
could be appealed to the district court.5 In addition, the district
court had the power to withdraw cases from the referees at any
stage.56 The referees were given jurisdiction over controversies
involving property in the actual or constructive possession of the
court.5 Claims falling within this limited area, known as the
summary bankruptcy jurisdiction, were resolved in the first in-
stance by the referees.58 Other bankruptcy-related disputes, such
as controversies involving property in the possession of third
parties, were deemed to fall within the plenary bankruptcy juris-
diction, and were heard by the district court unless the defen-
dant consented to proceedings before the referee.5
During the 1970s there was extensive discussion and debate
regarding proposals to revamp the bankruptcy system.60 Many
believed that the system of referees as well as the substantive
bankrupcy law was inadequate, and there was near unanimity
that the Bankruptcy Act needed to be overhauled.61 Bankruptcy
practitioners and judges described a system in crisis: while at-
tempting to cope with the increasingly complex and wide-rang-
ing litigation stemming from bankruptcy reorganizations of ma-
jor corporations, the bankruptcy courts were plagued with time-
consuming jurisdictional disputes and with delays due to
crowded district court dockets. 2
33 See id. at 5969.
11 U.S.C. § 62(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). Moreover, their salaries could be re-
duced. Id. § 68(a) (repealed 1978).
Id. § 67(c) (repealed 1978).
"BANK R.L 102, reported in 411 U.S. 1003-04 (1974).
s, 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) (repealed 1978).
Id. § 96(b) (actions to recover preferences); id. § 107(e) (actions to recover fraudu-
lent conveyances); id. § 110(c)(3) (actions to recover other property of debtor).
" Id. § 46; see MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Trust Co., 286 US. 263, 265-67 (1932).
Additionally, many bankruptcy-related disputes were heard by state courts, which had
concurrent jurisdiction over certain plenary suits see generally Coy TnM oN BAeNKRcU
3.01, at 3-24 to 3-30 (15th ed. 1979).
0 'Congress studied the matter for ten years before it acted. Wlee, Legislative His-
tory of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 941, 942 (1979). During that time,
Congress established a commission to study and recommend changes in the bankruptcy
law. See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5963. Congress held many hearings and pre-
pared numerous reports on the issue of revamping the bankruptcy system. See RIee,
supra, at 942-60.
61 See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5965, 6013-23, 6049-61.
" See id. at 5971-72. In his dissenting opinion in Marathon, Justice White noted
1983]
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Proposals for a revised system of bankruptcy courts engen-
dered debate as to whether Congress should establish the new
courts as article IH or as legislative courts.63 Those who favored
legislative bankruptcy courts argued that transforming the 200
bankruptcy judge positions into article HI appointments would
set an undesirable precedent toward judicial specialization, and
would give bankruptcy matters undeserved priority over other
types of federal litigation. They also contended that it would
dramatically increase the cost of the federal courts, and would
dilute the prestige and influence of federal judges." Proponents
of article III bankruptcy courts emphasized that bankruptcy liti-
gation had become so complex and required so much expertise
that it could not be left to generalist federal judges. They argued
that increasing the scope of jurisdiction guaranteed that bank-
ruptcy courts would face a wide variety of legal issues, and that
bankruptcy courts would require a broad range of judicial pow-
ers in order to function effectively. In light of the need for inde-
pendent federal bankruptcy courts with broad jurisdiction, they
contended that the only constitutionally acceptable solution was
to establish bankruptcy courts under article 111.65 The debate,
while vigorous, neither split along political party lines 6 nor
aroused significant public interest.67
Attentive to criticism of the summary/plenary distinction,
Congress, in enacting the Code,68 established bankruptcy courts
with significantly broader jurisdictional" and judicial powers70
that the annual volume of bankruptcy cases has increased over the past 30 years from
10,000 to 254,000 cases. 102 S. Ct, at 2895 n.16.
Compare House REPORT, supra note 7, at 5983-6013 (favoring article III courts)
with id. at 6425-35 (favoring article I courts).
See id. at 6425-35 (separate views of Congressmen Raisback, Danielson, Mann,
and Hyde).
See id. at 5983-6013.
" Representatives Railsback and Hyde, two of the 11 Republicans on the House
Judiciary Committee, joined Representatives Danielson and Mann, two of the Commit-
tee's 23 Democrats, to file a separate view opposing the Judiciary Committee's recom-
mendation that Congress establish article I bankruptcy courts. See id. at 6425-35.
11 Not surprisingly, the testimony at the hearings as well as the House Report itself
indicates that the major groups demonstrating interest in this matter were the bank-
ruptcy judges, the bankruptcy bar, and the article I federal judges. See id. at 6014-49
(opinions of various members of bar, bench. and academia regarding proposed bank-
ruptcy reform).
"See note 4 supra; notes 69-74 and accompanying text infra.
4! Section 241(a) of the Code provides that the bankruptcy courts shall have subject
matter jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under, in, or related to proceedings under
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without giving them the status of article III courts. Although
bankruptcy judges are nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate, rather than selected by the district
courts,'7 1 they are not granted life tenure. Instead, they are ap-
pointed for fourteen-year terms,7 2 subject to removal by the ju-
dicial council of the circuit court for incompetence, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability73 Nor are bank-
ruptcy judges guaranteed undiminished compensation; the Code
establishes an annual salary of $50,000, but expressly provides
that it is subject to adjustment.7
IlI. THE Marathon DECISION
At issue in the Marathon litigation was a contract for the
construction of a pipeline in Kentucky.75 The Northern Pipeline
Construction Company (Northern), undergoing reorganization in
a Minnesota bankruptcy court, filed a breach of contract action
there against Marathon Pipeline Company (Marathon).78 Mara-
thon moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
alleging that the Code's delegation of such a dispute to un-
tenured bankruptcy judges violated article III." After allowing
the United States to intervene to defend the statute, the bank-
ruptcy court denied the motion.78 The district court reversed,
ruling that Congress had transgressed article III by delegating
the bankruptcy laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
70 Bankruptcy judges may preside over jury trials, id. § 1480, issue declaratory judg-
ments, id. § 2201, issue writs of habeas corpus, id. § 2256, and issue any order, proces3, or
judgment necessary in aid of the cour's jurisdiction, id. §§ 451, 1479. They may not,
however, enjoin another court or punish certain instances of criminal contempt. Id. §
1481.
71 Id. § 152.
- Id. § 153(a).
7 Id. § 153(b). In contrast, article I judges serve during "good Behavior," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, and can only be removed by impeachment upon conviction of "Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" Id. art H, § 4.
74 28 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. 11 1979).
75 Jurisdictional Statement at A-10, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2588 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Statement].
76 102 S. Ct. at 2864.
7 Id. at 2864. The defendant also filed a motion requesting that the bankruptcy
court abstain until the conclusion of an earlier suit filed by Marathon against Northern
in a Kentucky state court, and an alternative motion seeking transer of the Mhinnesota
proceedings to the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Kentucky. Both motions
were denied. See Jurisdictional Statement supra note 75, at A3A11.
78 Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 75, at A3-AU.
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jurisdiction over this case to the bankruptcy court. 9 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.80
Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan determined that
prior Court opinions sanctioned only three types of legislative
courts: 1 territorial courts, military courts, and courts adjudicat-
ing "public rights. '82 With regard to territorial courts, Justice
Brennan stated that the Constitution grants Congress the au-
thority to exercise the "general powers of government"83 in cer-
tain geographical8 areas in which there is no state government.8 5
In his view, so long as Congress exercises the "general powers of
government" it can establish federal courts that do not satisfy
the requirements of article 111.8 6 Military courts comprise the
79 Id. at A1-A2.
80 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
81 Justice Brennan recognized that Congress established the bankruptcy courts in
1978 as "adjuncts" to the district courts rather than as independent legislative courts. Id.
at 2867 n.13. Nonetheless, his opinion was aimed at refuting Northern's argument that
Congress has the power to create legislative bankruptcy courts and, thus, had not imper-
missibly intruded into the judicial domain in enacting the Code in 1978. See id. at 2867.
"I Id. at 2867-71.
Id. at 2868.
64 The plurality, in classifying the local District of Columbia courts with the territo-
rial courts, interpreted the discussion in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973),
of the congressional power to create courts in "specialized areas having particularized
needs," id. at 408, as referring only to geographical areas, 102 S. Ct. at 2868. The concur-
rence did not join in this interpretation.
81 The plurality noted that article IV gives Congress the complete power of govern-
ment over United States territories, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and that article I
similarly gives Congress such power over the District of Columbia, 102 S. Ct. at 2868.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 17.
Although indicating that Congress has special powers over territories, see notes
81-85 and accompanying text supra, the plurality failed to explain why this power justi-
fies the creation of legislative territorial courts. Some have argued that the transitory
nature of federal control over territories necessitates that courts without life tenure be
established. Otherwise, as territories become states and establish independent state court
systems, the federal judiciary will have to absorb a surfeit of federal judges with life
tenure. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1962).
This reasoning is not persuasive. First, while the federal power over territories may
have seemed fleeting in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it does not seem so
today. At present, the only area within the continental United States that is not a state
is the District of Columbia. Moreover, "[t]he small number of remaining territories are
not apt to become states in the near future and even if they did, their judges could easily
be absorbed into the relatively large federal judiciary." Note, Legislative and Constitu-
tional Courts: What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation, 71 YALE L.J. 979, 982 (1962) (footnote
omitted).
Second, while Congress may believe that a dual system of legislative and article III
courts in the territories, see, e.g., District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. I, 84 Stat. 473 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. IV 1980))
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second category of legislative courts recognized by Justice Bren-
nan. He stated that the article III requirements are inapplicable
to courts martial because a specific constitutional grant empow-
ers Congress to regulate the armed forces, 7 a grant "historically
understood as giving the political branches of Government ex-
traordinary control" over trials of military matters.88
The third category identified by Justice Brennan consists of
both courts 9 and administrative agencies 0 that decide cases in-
volving "public rights." Justice Brennan offered a twofold ra-
tionale for his view that Congress may delegate to legislative
courts cases concerning public rights. First, he explained that
disputes regarding certain executive or legislative functions can
(creating system of legislative courts in District of Columbia to deal primarily with local
matters); 28 U.S.C. §§ 48 & 133 (1976) (creating article III courts in District of Columbia
to deal with traditional "federal" matters), would be constitutional, such an approach
fails to address the issues raised by the article III requirement of an independent judici-
ary. Although a parallel article III and legislative court system affords the protections of
an independent court system to more litigants than would a system guaranteeing liti-
gants access only to legislative courts, the parallel system would still violate article mI by
establishing federal courts without life tenure and salary protection. As these require-
ments are designed to ensure that judicial power is lodged in the judiciary and not else-
where, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra, any system that includes legislative
courts raises constitutional problems.
Others have contended that the absence of federalism restraints permits Congress to
establish legislative courts in the territories. Since the requirement of federalism that the
federal government show restraint when federal action might impinge upon states' inter-
ests, see note 185 infra, does not apply in the territories because the territorial govern-
ments are established by Congress rather than the states, Congress can act to create
legislative courts in the territories more freely than it can in the states. Note, Art icle I1
Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979
Magistrate Act, 39 COLUM. L. Rnv. 560, 583 (1980).
Article I provides that Congress may "m~ke Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
" 102 S. Ct. at 2869. Justice Brennan did not explain why the constitutional grant
to Congress of power over military affairs overrules the explicit requirement of article III
or obviates the need for judicial independence in military courts. While the exigencies of
combat would no doubt often inhibit the functioning of civilian tribunals established
under article III, the argument that military courts can dispense with judicial indepen-
dence is not compelling. Indeed, a concern for judicial independence has given rise to
proposals that Congress remove military judges from the chain of command and e3tab-
lish a separate quasi-military unit of judges afforded the protections of article III. See ML
REDiSH, supra note 1, at 39-40.
' E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6213 (1976) (Tax Court).
E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 659(c), 661, 666(i) (1976) (Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) (Environmental Protection
Agency).
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be committed wholly to nonjudicial determination."1 Since a
nonjudicial ruling would be constitutional, then a ruling by a
court lacking the article III protections for judicial independence
also would- suffice.9 2 Second, Justice Brennan asserted that be-
cause Congress has the power to create public rights, it also may
limit the manner in which public rights are adjudicated.93 Ac-
cordingly, he reasoned, Congress can provide that the only re-
course for claims arising under federal statutes creating public
rights is to a legislative court.9 ' Justice Brennan, however, failed
to define public rights precisely, stating only that a "matter of
public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the government
and others,' " while a private right involves "the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined."9'
Turning to Northern's contract claim, Justice Brennan
noted that the exceptions for territorial and military courts were
inapplicable. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court could adjudicate
91 102 S. Ct. at 2869.
* Id. at 2879. In effect, the plurality contended that certain disputes regarding ex-
ecutive or legislative decisions are not "inherently judicial" matters, and that the article
I policies only apply to tribunals considering judicial matters, as opposed to tribunals
making determinations that could have been left to the legislative or executive branches
in the first instance.
The plurality indicated that the claims that may be assigned wholly to nonjudicial
resolution may include questions arising under the customs laws and certain immigration
matters. See id. at 2870 n.19. In the early part of the twentieth century, the Court, rely-
ing on Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce and to control the admission of
aliens, held that Congress could delegate to administrative officers the authority to value
imported merchandise and to exclude certain aliens from the United States. See Oceanic
Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (power to fine steamship company for illegal
transport of aliens with contagious diseases could be entrusted to executive officer); Pas-
savant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893) (Congress can delegate to executive officers
final authority to value imported goods ind to impose fines for undervaluation).
While these cases have not been overruled, their authority has been eroded. A num-
ber of commentators have questioned the notion that the executive may collect and regu-
late customs without judicial process. See, e.g., D. CURmRE, FEDERAL JURISDICION IN A
NUTSHELL 40 (1981). Similarly, a number of court decisions recognize a right to judicial
review of immigration decisions made by the executive. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
93 102 S. Ct. at 2876.
Id. at 2876-78.
"Id. at 2870 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
Id. at 2870-71 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). In apparent
contradiction to this definition and with no attempt at explanation, Justice Brennan has-
tened to add that criminal cases, which clearly arise "between the government and
others" and fundamentally implicate the public interest, do not fall within the public
rights category. See id. at 2871 n.24.
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the controversy only if the suit involved public rights. Justice
Brennan declared that the fact that the plaintiff was involved in
a bankruptcy proceeding did not transform a simple contract ac-
tion between two private corporations into a matter of public
rights.9 Thus, because none of the recognized categories ap-
plied, Justice Brennan concluded that non-article In adjudica-
tion was improper.98
7 Id. at 2871-72.
" The plurality also rejected Marathon's arguments that the constitutional grant of
power over bankruptcy matters to Congress authorizes the creation of specialized bank-
ruptcy courts, and that the bankruptcy courts under the Code are adjuncts to the federal
district courts. See id. at 2872-78. Acknowledging that article I contains an express grant
of authority to Congress to establish uniform national bankruptcy laws, see U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, ci. 4, the plurality nonetheless rejected the argument that this grant includes
an inherent power to establish article I courts to adjudicate proceedings related to bank-
ruptcies. 102 S. Ct. at 2872-73. If such power inheres in all constitutional grants of law-
making authority, the plurality reasoned, then Congress could create article I courts to
resolve all disputes related to actions arising under federal statutes. Id. at 2873. In Ju3-
tice Brennan's view, such a broad interpretation of Congress' authority to establish arti-.
cle I courts would eviscerate the independence of the federal judiciary. Id. at 2878 &
n.28.
In addition, the plurality rejected the argument that bankruptcy judges function, in
a capacity analogous to that of federal magistrates, as adjuncts to the district courts. Id.
at 2874-78. Noting that the Code transformed the bankruptcy courts by removing the
power of appointment from the judiciary and placing it in the other branches of govern-
ment, compare 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (repealed 1978) (providing for appointment of
bankruptcy referees by federal judges) with 28 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. 111 1979) (providing
for presidential appointment of bankruptcy judges), by expanding the subject matter
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, see, eg., icL § 1471(b)(c) (providing bankruptcy
courts with jurisdiction over all cases arising under, in, or related to, bankruptcy pro-
ceedings), and by endowing bankruptcy courts with most of the powers of the district
courts, see 102 S. Ct. at 2879, including the power to preside over jury trials, 28 U..C. §
1480 (Supp. I 1979), to issue writs of habeas corpus, id. § 2256, to punish contempt, id.
§§ 105(a), 1481, and to enter binding and enforceable judgments, 11 US.C. § 105(a)
(Supp. M 1979), the plurality determined that Congress had not established mere "ad-
juncts" but separate legislative courts that were independent of the district courts.
cfi]See 102 S. Ct. at 2878-80.
Based on its analysis of the bankruptcy courts and of the facts in Marathon, the
plurality concluded that article MI prohibits a bankruptcy court from adjudicating the
private state-created cause of action brought by Northern against Marathon, and af-
firmed the judgment entered by the district court dismissing the suit. Id. at 2880. The
plurality also stated that because the Code's jurisdictional provision was nonseverable,
the provision must fall in its entirety. Id. at 2879-80 & n.40. Accordingly, § 241(a) of the
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a)-(e) (Supp. Il 1979), was declared unconstitutional.
In deciding the severability issue the plurality stressed that Congres' purpose in
restructuring the bankruptcy system was to "ensure adjudication of all claims in a single
forum and to avoid the delay and expense of jurisdictional disputes." 102 S. C at 2830
n.40. Because Congress vested broad jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts pursuant to a
single statutory grant, the plurality concluded that it could not predict whether, faced
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Although the concurrence authored' by Justice Rehnquist
and joined by Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that
article III had been violated,"9 it expressly rejected the plural-
ity's historical synthesis.100 Emphasizing that Northern's claims
arose wholly under state law, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
this type of dispute was judicial in nature and that its resolution
would entail an exercise of judicial power. In his view, article III
required that the case be assigned to the independent federal
judiciary.10 1
Justice White's lengthy dissent, in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger ' 02 and Justice Powell joined, took exception to nearly every
point raised by the plurality. Justice White was especially troub-
led by the assertion that legislative courts are permissible only
in three narrow situations. Contending that the organizing prin-
ciples used by the plurality in developing its synthesis were
faulty,103 Justice White observed that legislative courts have
been permitted to function within states, as well as within terri-
tories, 04 to adjudicate disputes arising under the non-military,
as well as military powers delegated by article I to Congress,10 5
with the Marathon decision, Congress would simply reassign claims such as Northern's
from the legislative bankruptcy courts to the district courts while directing related bank-
ruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts, or would establish article III bankruptcy courts
that could adjudicate all bankruptcy-related claims in one forum.
The uncertainty of the likely congressional response, as well as the novelty of the
constitutional issue, also led the plurality to rule that its decision should apply only
prospectively, and to stay its judgment for three months in order to give Congress time
to restructure the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. See id. at 2880. When Congress
did not act within three months, the Supreme Court granted a ten week extension of the
stay. 51 U.S.L.W. 3259 (Oct. 5, 1982). However, when Congress still had not enacted
legislation to restructure the bankruptcy courts at the end of the second stay, the Court
refused a further extension. 51 U.S.L.W. 3475 (Jan. 4, 1983).
" See 102 S. Ct. at 2882.
100 Id. at 2881.
101 Id. The concurrence also determined that the bankruptcy courts could not be
categorized as mere "adjuncts" to either the district courts or the courts of appeal. Id. at
2882.
102 Chief Justice Burger also filed a separate dissenting opinion. However, it will not
be discussed as it failed to address the policies underlying article Il. Instead it focused
on the issue of severability of the jurisdictional provisions and suggested a plan for a
modest restructuring of the bankruptcy courts.
103 102 S. Ct. at 2882-96.
104 Id. at 2888 & n.8. Administrative agencies, for example, adjudicate matters that
arise within the states.
105 For example, pursuant to the taxing power, see U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
Congress established the Tax Court as a legislative court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1976).
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and to decide matters of private, as well as public rights.'0 0
Thus, Justice White was convinced that legislative courts may
"cover virtually the whole domain of possible areas of adjudica-
tion."'1 07 In his view, legislative courts can be explained only as
the product of "a 'confluence of practical considerations.' "10
These considerations include, among others, the political nature
of the dispute,109 the availability of article III appellate re-
view,11° and Congress' reason for not using an article III court.22
The dissent hastened to add that while "Article MI is not to
be read out of the Constitution. . .it should be read as expres-
sing one value that must be balanced against competing consti-
tutional values and legislative responsibilities." 2 Consequently,
Justice White would test the constitutionality of legislative
courts on a case-by-case basis, weighing the legislative interests
advanced against the burdens imposed on article I values."3
Applying this test to the instant case, the dissent identified
two factors-the fact that most bankruptcy cases are nonpoliti-
cal," 4 and the fact that litigants are guaranteed article III appel-
late review15-as important indicia that the bankruptcy courts
accommodate rather than undermine article I values. As evi-
dence of the legitimate legislative interest involved, Justice
White stressed that the decision to expand significantly the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction was amply supported by the tes-
timony and other evidence presented to Congress. Under these
circumstances, Justice White concluded that the new bank-
ruptcy courts did not violate article H. 10
108 102 S. Ct. at 2888-89. The obvious example is Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932), which upheld the power of the United States Employee's Compensation Commis-
sion to determine facts in cases involving private rights.
107 102 S. Ct. at 2889.
103 Id. at 2893.
109 Id. at 2895.
110 Id. at 2894-95.
1 Id. at 2895.
112 Id. at 2893.
11 Id. at 2894.
114 Id. at 2895.
I15 Id. at 2894. Under some circumstances, appeal is to the district court, see 28
U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. M 1979), with a further right of appeal to the court of appeals, see
id. § 1293. In other cases, appeal is first made to a panel of bankruptcy judges, see id. §
1482, and then to the court of appeals, see id. § 1293.
"' The dissent also rejected the plurality's conclusion as to severability, asserting
that the remainder of the jurisdictional grant could have functioned even in the absence
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IV. SHEDDING DIM LIGHT
The Marathon decision provides little illumination to guide
of the invalid portion. See 102 S. Ct. at 2884 n.3. In addition, the dissent criticized the
plurality's attempt to distinguish the powers of the bankruptcy courts from those of ad-
ministrative agencies and federal magistrates. See id. at 2885-88. In the plurality's view,
neither federal magistrates nor administrative agencies exercised "'the essential attrib-
utes' of judicial power," id. at 2876 (plurality opinion), because certain important func-
tions were reserved to article III courts. With respect to the administrative adjudication
upheld in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the plurality stressed (1) that the
agency made only narrow factuhl determinations; (2) that the agency had no enforce-
ment powers of its own; and, (3) that agency fact-finding was reviewed under a strict
legal standard. Id. at 2878-79. As for federal magistrates, the plurality emphasized that
although they were given the authority to adjudicate certain pretrial motions, final au-
thority for their decisions rested with the district courts. Id. at 2876.
The dissent disagreed with this characterization of the powers of agency tribunals.
Moreover, the dissent regarded this comparison as inapt. In its view, a more useful com-
parison would have been between the powers of bankruptcy courts under the Code and
the powers exercised by the pre-Code bankruptcy referees. See id. at 2887 (White, J.,
dissenting). The dissent noted that the powers granted bankruptcy judges under the
Code were only slightly greater than those of the referees. Id. According to the dissent,
any difference between the powers of the old and the new bankruptcy courts was consti-
tutionally insignificant; the decisions of both courts were reviewed under the deferential
"clearly erroneous" standard, and both had the power to render binding decisions. Id. As
the old bankruptcy system had never been questioned on article III grounds, the dissent
could see no reason why such a challenge was valid now.
The dissent's argument is flawed in two respects. First, the comparison with the pre-
Code scheme is misleading. Unlike the bankruptcy judges under the Code, see note 71
and accompanying text supra, the referees were selected by the judicial branch, not the
executive or legislative. See note 54 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, any threat
to the independence of the bankruptcy referees would have come from within the judi-
cial branch, whereas threats to the independence of the new bankruptcy court judges
would emanate from the other branches. Moreover, the summary/plenary distinction
meant that referees exercised jurisdiction only over a fairly narrow range of subjects;
plenary matters, such as Northern's contract claim, were reserved for the district courts.
See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra. This distinction should not be overem-
phasized, however, because in practice most bankruptcy-related matters were routed
back to the bankruptcy courts. Bankr. R. 102, reported in 411 U.S. 1003 (1974).
Additionally, the dissent's reliance on decisions upholding the constitutionality of
the old bankruptcy system, see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (upholding refe-
ree's right to disallow preference), is misplaced. Because the bankruptcy referees had
accumulated substantial powers in the wake of the 1973 promulgation of the Bankruptcy
Rules, see 102 S. Ct. at 2876 n.31 (plurality opinion), pre-1973 decisions are not persua-
sive. More importantly, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), on which the dissent
relied, did not even address the article I issue. See id.
Second, the dissent's implication that bankruptcy courts exercise no greater powers
than do administrative agencies is incorrect. Although their powers are similar in many
respects, several distinctions should not be overlooked. For example, administrative
agencies are not confronted with the breadth of subject matter faced by bankruptcy
courts granted jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under ... in or related to
cases arising under [the bankruptcy laws]." 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. 111 1979). Unlike
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future travelers out of the constitutional darkness surrounding
legislative courts. Although the two major opinions identify the
constitutional problems that arise when Congress establishes
legislative courts, neither satisfactorily limits Congress' power in
this area. The opinions take such conflicting approaches that
Marathon provides no guidance for future efforts to fashion leg-
islative courts that do not violate article III. Once again, Con-
gress must await a Supreme Court ruling to determine whether
it has strayed too far from the requirements of article HIL. Never-
theless, the Marathon opinions can be understood at least in
part as failed attempts to reconcile the policies underlying judi-
cial independence-impartial decisionmaking, separation of
powers, and checks and balances-with the precedents concern-
ing legislative courts and with the facts of Marathon itself.
A. Historical Fact Versus Political Theory
The plurality began its analysis by setting forth the policies
behind the framers' decision to create an independent federal
judiciary. First, Justice Brennan noted that "[t]o ensure against
[the accumulation of power in the same hands], the Framers
provided that the Federal Government would consist of three
distinct Branches, each to exercise one of the governmental pow-
ers recognized by the Framers as inherently distinct."'1 7 This
statement, of course, refers to the concept of separation of pow-
ers. Second, the plurality noted that "[t]he Federal Judiciary
was... designed by the Framers to stand independent of the
Executive and Legislature-to maintain the checks and balances
of the constitutional structure.""' Thus, Justice Brennan ac-
knowledged the relationship of judicial independence to the
checks and balances doctrine. Third, Justice Brennan observed
that the framers designed an independent judicial branch "to
guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained im-
partial."" 9 Thus the plurality also recognized the value of judi-
bankruptcy courts, administrative agencies cannot preside over jury trials or issue writs
of habeas corpus or contempt citations. See id. § 1480 (jury trials); id. § 2256 (habeas
corpus); id. § 1481 (contempt). Moreover, although administrative agencies may impose
civil penalties, enforcement is only available through the district courts. See Atlas Roof-
ing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
117 102 S. Ct. at 2864.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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cial independence to the litigants.
But despite paying lip-service to these concerns, the plural-
ity failed to incorporate them adequately into its analysis of the
legality of bankruptcy courts. Instead, the plurality opted to rely
only on the doctrine of separation of powers, bolstered by an
analysis of "historical fact,112 0 in defending its rigid classifica-
tion of the permissible types of legislative courts.121 With regard
to territorial and military courts, the plurality asserted that
their existence was wholly consistent with both separation of
powers and historical precedent. 22 Justice Brennan asserted
that both types of courts addressed matters that had always
been considered beyond judicial cognizance. 23 In his view, when
the framers separated governmental functions, territorial and
military affairs were assigned solely to the political branches,124
and the existence of legislative territorial and military courts in
the early decades following the constitutional convention evi-
denced this understanding. 25 Therefore, according to Justice
Brennan, because territorial and military matters are not within
the federal judicial power, a congressional decision to establish
legislative territorial and military courts does not impinge on the
constitutional requirement that all judicial power of the federal
government be vested in an independent judiciary. Although
Justice Brennan did not articulate the implications of this
analysis for the system of checks and balances, he also may have
regarded that principle as consonant with the existence of legis-
lative territorial and military courts. Because he believed the ju-
dicial branch to be completely excluded from territorial and mil-
itary affairs, it is likely that Justice Brennan would not perceive
any need in these areas for the potential check that an article III
court would provide.
The plurality's approach, in characterizing territorial and
military courts as tribunals concerned with issues beyond the
1 0 Id. at 2870 n.20.
12 Id. at 2868-71.
122 Id. at 2868-69.
123 Id.
124 Id.
121 Id. Therefore, in the plurality's view, the constitutional text (see art. IV, § 3, cl.
2; art. I § 8, cl. 17) bolsters the historical evidence that these matters are not within the
federal judicial power. Consequently, the existence of legislative territorial and military
courts does not raise the difficult question of when, if ever, federal judicial power may be
assigned to a legislative court.
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federal judicial power, has superficial appeal. But as Justice
White notes, it is inconsistent to assert that adjudication by ter-
ritorial courts lies beyond the scope of article III, while conced-
ing that article III courts can review territorial court decisions. 28
Furthermore, the plurality's interpretation presumed that the
framers were unconcerned that legislative and judicial power in
the territories would be consolidated in the hands of Congress.
As discussed earlier, the framers believed that a government
structured to allow such consolidation would tend toward tyr-
anny.- 7 While it is possible the framers may have considered
the exigencies of military command so compelling that they
deemed autocratic power justifiable in the armed forces,1 28 Jus-
tice Brennan pointed to no evidence indicating that the framers
held-similar views with respect to territorial government.
Similarly, the plurality failed to provide any evidence that
the framers were unconcerned with the right of litigants in terri-
torial courts to impartial decisionmaking. Here again, due to the
arguably overwhelming need to exercise discipline, the framers
may have accepted the possibility of institutional bias in mili-
tary courts.129 But it is doubtful that the framers believed that
citizens residing in territories deserved anything less than fully
independent judges.
The plurality took a dual approach to tribunals adjudicating
public rights, characterizing some disputes between the govern-
ments and individuals as beyond judicial cognizance, and others
as limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. With regard to
the first category, the plurality stated that "the public-rights
doctrine also draws upon the principle of separation of powers,
and an historical understanding that certain prerogatives were
reserved to the political branches of government."'8 01 These pre-
rogatives barred judicial interference in "matters that histori-
cally could have been determined exclusively by [the legislative
or executive] departments."131 Although it provided no details
concerning which matters could be delegated exclusively to the
political branches, the plurality cited as an example an early
128 Id. at 2889 (White, J., dissenting).
22 See notes 24-38 and accompanying text supra.
1 See M. REDiSH, supra note 1, at 39-40.
129 Id.
130 102 S. Ct. at 2869.
1 Id. at 2869-70.
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twentieth-century case concerning immigration,'32 an area in
which Congress has plenary power and in which, due to the for-
eign relations overtones, the executive is often given a free
hand. 33 Accordingly, the plurality concluded that where prerog-
atives historically reserved to the political branches are at stake,
the decision to assign control over these matters to legislative
courts does not implicate the federal judicial power and there-
fore does not violate the principle of separation of powers.
With regard to the second category of public rights cases,
the plurality relied primarily on history to justify adjudication
by legislative courts. Justice Brennan implied that cases that
could not be heard by courts in 1789 are not within the federal
judicial power. Because the United States had not waived its im-
munity to suit in 1789 and because at that time few public rights
had been created, the plurality concluded that suits against the
United States and suits based on public rights are not within the
judicial power vested in article III courts and consequently could
be assigned to legislative courts lacking the constitutional guar-
antees of judicial independence." 4
It is here that the plurality's inattention to the policies be-
hind judicial independence seriously undermines its analysis.
Taken to its logical extreme, the plurality's view of the public
rights doctrine would allow the government to require that all
suits challenging governmental action be assigned to courts con-
trolled by the executive or legislature. 3 5 The plurality asserted
that its limitations on legislative courts protect the core of the
article III judicial power, which, in its view, consists only of "all
131 Id. at 2870 n.19. In Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909), the
Supreme Court held that the decision to impose a fine on a steamship company for viola-
tions of the immigration laws could be entrusted solely to an executive officer.
M' See Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 754, 766-67 (1972) (policies relating to aliens
are set by political branches, and power to exclude aliens is necessary to maintain inter-
national relations); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(Congress' power over foreign commerce and President's power over foreign affairs give
political branches broad power to regulate admission of aliens).
1 See 102 S. Ct. at 2869-70.
1 To the extent that the plurality implied that actions taken by the executive or
legislature within their sphere are completely insulated from judicial review, this is erro-
neous. For example, there exists a well developed body of law concerning the rights of
government employees to judicial resolution of their disputes with the government. See,
e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167, 177, 211 (1974) (government cannot eliminate
federal employee's due process right to hearing by simply defining his statutory entitle-
ment to not include such right).
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private adjudications in federal courts within the
States-matters from their nature subject to 'a suit at common
law or in equity or admirality'-and all criminal matters, with
the narrow exception of military crimes."130 In light of the poli-
cies of checks and balances and separation of powers, however, a
strong argument can be made that the core of judicial power in-
cludes public rights cases challenging the validity of legislative
or executive actions. This broader description of the core of fed-
eral judicial power finds particular support in the checks and
balances structure of the Constitution.137 A major role of the
federal judiciary is to declare unlawful congressional or execu-
tive actions that exceed their powers under the Constitution.1 s
The article Ill guarantees protect the judiciary in its exercise of
the power to invalidate legislative or executive action. In con-
trast, legislative courts may be less vigilant in this regard due to
their economic dependence upon the political branches. Because
the need to check unlawful acts by the executive or legislature is
more likely to arise in suits challenging government actions
rather than in litigation between private parties, allowing legis-
lative courts to adjudicate public rights cases thwarts the policy
of checks and balances." 9
Furthermore, excluding public rights cases from the federal
judicial power runs counter to the separation of powers doctrine.
Under the plurality's definition, public rights litigation encom-
passes a broad range of controversies. By designating all suits
"between the government and others" as outside the federal ju-
dicial power, the plurality implied that an enormous amount of
litigation could be assigned to legislative courts, thus allowing
Congress to perform both legislative and adjudicatory functions
in a large number of situations. This approach severely under-
cuts the framers' attempt to assign separate functions to the
three branches of government.
In addition, the public rights exception thwarts the framers'
attempt to ensure impartial decisionmaking. There is a signifi-
cant risk that judges of legislative courts, faced with constant
challenges to actions taken by the governmental branches that
1" 102 S. Ct. at 2871 n.25.
137 See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
I See note 36 supra.
189 102 S. Ct. at 2885.
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control their salary and reappointment, may develop an institu-
tional bias toward the government's position.140 Justice Brennan
not only failed to address this concern in his analysis of public
rights, but his expansive definition of public rights ensures that
many litigants will have recourse only to a legislative tribunal.
The plurality's failure to accommodate the policies behind
the article III requirements for judicial independence weakened
its analysis. This failure is no oversight. Indeed, Justice Brennan
explicitly rejected the importance of policy considerations in in-
terpreting the express words of article III:
Doubtless it could be argued that the need for independent judi-
cial determination is greatest in cases arising between the government
and an individual. But the rationale for the public-rights line of cases
lies not in political theory, but rather in Congress' and this Court's
understanding of what power was reserved to the Judiciary by the
Constitution as a matter of historical fact.141
I
Yet history is an inadequate guide to the proper scope of the
public rights doctrine, as Justice Brennan himself impliedly con-
ceded.142 Moreover, newly created rights by definition have no
history. A court must look elsewhere in order to determine
whether the new right creates circumstances under which legis-
lative courts would be constitutional. Although Justice Brennan
rejected "political theory," nothing else provides a basis for
principled decisionmaking. Without a doubt, the policies behind
judicial independence are difficult to reconcile with existing pre-
cedent. 43 But that is no reason to abandon these policies when
Congress ventures to establish legislative courts in areas where
140 Because an article I judge does not have the article III protections of life tenure
and an irreducible salary, he is beholden to the political branches for his continued liveli-
hood. Despite this obvious dependence, his role in public rights cases constantly requires
a choice between the government's contentions and those of an individual. In addition,
the article I court, if it oversees a "specialized" area of the law as do most today, will
hear the same government attorneys time and again, and will be constantly apprised of
the government's position on all matters. This, too, may eventually result in the court's
taking the government's view in resolving disputes.
102 S. Ct. at 2870 n.20.
142 Justice Brennan's admission that the scope of the public rights exception to arti-
cle III is difficult to define reveals that history does not provide ready answers to the
constitutional questions raised by the creation of legislative courts. Id. at 2870.
141 Under a strict separation of powers approach any adjudication outside the judi-
cial branch is forbidden. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra. Yet such adjudi-
cation has been frequently upheld. See 102 S. Ct. at 2889-93.
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they would not have been countenanced in 1789.144
In sum, the plurality approached the problem of legislative
courts by studying the characteristics of those that had been ap-
proved in the past. To the extent that Justice Brennan looked
beyond "historical fact" and relied on policy considerations,'4 5
he focused on separation of powers. He believed that legislative
courts were permissible in three areas, the majority of which he
defined as being completely within the political sphere.","
Based on its view of the limited categories of legislative
courts, the plurality held that the new bankruptcy courts were
unconstitutional.147 Although article I expressly grants Congress
the power to make laws concerning bankruptcy, the plurality
found no historical understanding that all suits by a bankrupt
implicate public rights to such an extent that they may be as-
signed to legislative courts wholly beyond the ken of the judicial
branch.1" 8 Thus the plurality concluded that allowing Congress
to assign bankruptcy-related state law claims to legislative
courts would, in effect, permit the legislative branch to exercise
judicial power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
B. A Narrower Approach
As discussed previously, Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
differed markedly from the plurality's approach. He limited his
discussion solely to the issue presented by the suit- whether a
breach of contract action filed by a corporation undergoing
bankruptcy reorganization can be adjudicated by a legislative
court.149 Justice Rehnquist concluded that since state law breach
of contract actions between private parties would have been ad-
judicated in a judicial forum in 1789, the framers would have
considered Northern's claim to be within the judicial power."5
As a consequence, in Justice Rehnquist's view, the Constitution
I" See id. at 2893 ("To say that the Court has failed to articulate a principle by
which we can test the constitutionality of a putative Article I ourt ... is not to say that
this Court must always defer to the legislative decision to create Article I... courts.").
145 102 S. Ct. at 2870 n.20.
148 See notes 81-96 and accompanying text supra.
11 102 S. Ct. at 2878-80.
148 Id. at 2881-83.
14, Id. at 2881.
150 Id.
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for other cases, so far as it goes, it is difficult to fault: if, in 1789,
the matter would have been tried by common law courts, it is
within the federal judicial power and may not be adjudicated by
a legislative court.152 While Justice Rehnquist does not articu-
late the article III policies behind judicial independence, his ap-
proach is consistent with them. First, the concept of separation
of powers is advanced by ensuring that all matters deemed
within the judicial power at common law may not be adjudicated
by federal courts controlled by the political branches. Second,
requiring article III adjudication of all matters historically rec-
ognized as "judicial" advances the checks and balances policy, as
it ensures that the courts resolving those disputes are sufficiently
independent to invalidate unlawful actions by the legislature or
the executive. 153 Third, judicial impartiality is furthered because
litigants are guaranteed trials before judges dependent on no
one for their continued livelihood.
Under Justice Rehnquist's approach, only when history does
not indicate whether a case would have been included within the
framers' view of the federal judicial power must one consider
whether the dispute can be assigned to a legislative court. Jus-
tice Rehnquist did not reach that issue, however, and he gave no
indication as to how he would analyze such a case. In the face of
the efforts by the plurality and the dissent to devise a coherent
theory about legislative courts and to reconcile past cases, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's silence is unsatisfying. Though consonant with
the policies behind judicial independence, his analysis fails even
to attempt to reconcile prior Supreme Court precedent,'" much
less to address the central issues concerning legislative courts
raised by the plurality and the dissent. Thus, Justice Rehnquist
sheds dim light, at best, on the circumstances under which Con-
gress can establish legislative courts.
" Justice Rehnquist noted that Northern's claim was "the stuff of the traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789." Id.
"5 Of course, where a private state law dispute is involved, as in Marathon, it is
unlikely that the courts will exercise a check on the other branches. Indeed, with the
possible exception of the underlying grant of federal jurisdiction, there may be no federal
action to check.
'" See 102 S. Ct. at 2881-82.
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C. Policy, Not History
In contrast to the approaches taken by Justices Brennan
and Rehnquist, Justice White eschewed history in his analysis,
because he concluded that the precedents revealed no coherent
principles distinguishing between matters assignable to legisla-
tive courts and to article I courts. 1 5 He determined that article
III adjudication is no different from that performed by legisla-
tive courts, and that both kinds of courts exercise the federal
judicial power.156 In fact, Justice White expressly rejected the
idea that the Constitution prohibits Congress from granting ju-
dicial power to legislative courts, opting instead for an ad hoc
balancing test.157 In his test, Justice White proposed to balance
the policies behind the article III guarantees of judicial indepen-
dence against the policies that led Congress to delegate judicial
power to a legislative court. Only if the former outweighed the
latter would Justice White require an article HI decisionmaker
throughout the adjudication.15 8 This analysis has two flaws.
First, Justice White's failure to articulate satisfactorily the poli-
cies behind judicial independence distorts the balancing test
suggested.159 Second, Justice White's test would permit the
wholesale assignment to legislative courts of adjudication tradi-
tionally reserved to article II forums.16 0
1. Policies Supporting Judicial Independence
With regard to the first problem, Justice White failed to
recognize the separation of powers policy incorporated into the
Constitution by the framers. Although he referred to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, Justice White used that term to mean
155 See id. at 2893 (White, J., dissenting).
5 See id.
157 See id.
15 See 102 S. Ct. at 2894. Unfortunately, Justice White did not indicate how much
weight should be assigned to the relevant factors. See 102 S. Ct. at 2894. Judges are thus,
in effect, left to muddle through to a conclusion. Although balancing tests are not new to
constitutional law, the test outlined by Justice White is particularly inchoate. This raises
both the problem that Congress is deprived of clear guidelines for formulating legislative
courts and that the specter of courts faced with a politically charged atmo3phere may
indulge in unprincipled manipulation.
159 See notes 161-73 and accompanying text infra.
160 See notes 174-81 and accompanying text infra.
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the analytically distinct policy of checks and balances.161 Justice
White did not acknowledge that, in itself, the assignment of ju-
dicial power to the legislative branch violates the principle of
separation of powers. Although it may be reasonable to under-
state the importance of separation of powers as a means of de-
terring tyranny so long as the courts retain their ability to check
the actions of the other branches, Justice White's failure to dis-
tinguish between the two ideas weakened his analysis.
Justice White's confusion is manifest in his contention that
because Congress constitutionally may assign adjudication to
state courts, many of which are staffed by judges who lack life
tenure and irreducible salaries, Congress can also assign adjudi-
cation of the same issues to federal legislative courts. 162 This ar-
gument ignores the framers' concern that excessive power con-
centrated in one branch of government might lead to tyranny.
To assure that governmental power would not be consolidated in
this way, the framers devised a structure of divided powers, and,
accordingly, directed that the judicial power be vested exclu-
sively in the judicial branch.6 ' However, assigning the judicial
power to state courts poses no separation of powers problam be-
cause it does not result in the consolidation of two or more func-
tions in one branch of the federal government. But such a con-
solidation of functions is exactly what happens when Congress
vests the judicial power in a legislative court.
Justice White's analysis does, on the other hand, incorpo-
rate the principle of checks and balances. Thus, Justice White
stressed the importance of determining whether a system of leg-
islative courts "represents an attempt by the political branches
of government to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the
third branch or an attempt to undermine the authority of con-
stitutional courts in general."164 This checks and balances focus
led Justice White to accord substantial weight to provisions for
appellate review by article III courts."6 5 Because appellate review
161 Justice White focused on the fact that bankruptcy litigation is not likely to in-
volve political issues revolving around actions by the federal government (checks and
balances), see 102 S. Ct. at 2895, rather than on whether the legislature is performing
adjudicatory functions (separation of powers).
162 See id.
M63 See note 6 supra.
164 102 S. Ct. at 2895.
115 Id. at 2894-95.
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ensures that the judiciary has the final say on the legality of con-
gressional or executive action, in Justice White's view it enables
the courts to discharge their role of checking the other branches.
In addition, Justice White recognized the third policy un-
derlying the article I requirements, the need for judicial impar-
tiality. Although he considered this need of little importance in
the bankruptcy context,1 68 Justice White indicated that it would
be unconstitutional to assign to legislative courts matters that
are likely to incur executive or legislative pressure on the
decisionmaker. 67
In order to evaluate the constitutionality of a legislative
court, Justice White proposed to balance the article I policies,
particularly the checks and balances principle, against the fac-
tors that led Congress to assign the matter to a tribunal outside
the judicial branch.6 8 Justice White also catalogued the legisla-
tive interests that, in his view, justified the creation of a legisla-
tive court system, listing the need to expedite judicial action, to
relieve burdens on article Ill courts, and to maintain flexibility
by staffing new courts with judges without life tenure.'0 9
Although Justice White's test is both imprecise and open-
ended, raising the possibility that it would be applied in an un-
principled fashion,7 0 presumably the significant factors and
their relative weights would be defined more clearly as courts
applied the test.171 More disturbing is the extent to which Jus-
tice White's test accords excessive deference to the government
interests asserted by Congress on behalf of legislative courts. Al-
though Justice White gives the final say on the legitimacy of the
asserted justifications to the judiciary, interests that he identi-
fies as valid1 2 suggest that considerations of efficiency and ad-
ministrative convenience merit great weight. Since legislative
courts exist in derogation of the express constitutional command
that the judicial power be exercised by an independent judiciary,
the carte blanche given to Congress is troublesome. While prag-
I See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
167 102 S. Ct. at 2895.
16 Id. at 2894.
169 Id. at 2895-96.
27 See note 158 supra.
171 Balancing tests in other areas of constitutional law, such as the first amendment,
have developed gradually.
172 See notes 112-16 & 169 and accompanying text supra.
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matic considerations may have influenced past Supreme Court
decisions approving legislative courts,"' this does not warrant
jettisoning the policy considerations that led the framers to con-
struct safeguards to ensure the judiciary's independence from
executive and legislative control.
2. Limits on Assigning Judicial Power to Legislative Courts
A more fundamental problem with Justice White's test is
that it would permit Congress to assign a major portion of the
judicial power to legislative courts. Justice White's analysis itself
reveals this possibility. He states that bankruptcy litigation in
general, and the Marathon suit in particular, could be delegated
to legislative courts so long as article III appellate review is re-
tained and Congress articulates valid reasons for the delega-
tion.17 ' In reaching this conclusion, Justice White accommodated
two of the policies underlying the article III guarantees. The
checks and balances principle is not undermined because bank-
ruptcy litigation largely involves private disputes arising under
state law, which means that the need to check actions by the
other branches of the federal government would not arise.'" To
the extent that a check is needed, appellate review by article III
courts is available.176 Justice White also acknowledged the im-
portance of impartial decisionmaking, noting that it is unlikely
that a bankruptcy judge would be influenced by the political
branches or would be subject to an institutional bias in resolving
the private disputes that comprise the majority of bankruptcy
claims.17 7 Because two of the article III policies are accommo-
dated adequately in Justice White's view, concerns for efficiency
and administrative convenience can override the language of ar-
ticle HI and justify a legislative bankruptcy court.
Unfortunately, Justice White's approach, while acceptable
in a limited context, T1 7 could result in a radical restructuring of
the federal judicial power. For example, nothing in his analysis
would prevent Congress from assigning all diversity and admi-
17 See 102 S. Ct. at 2893.
'" Id. at 2894-95.
17 See id. at 2895.
178 See id. at 2894.
177 See id. at 2895.
17 See note 181 and accompanying text infra.
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ralty suits to legislative courts. As these classes of cases typically
involve private disputes over rights recognized at common law, it
is unlikely federal governmental action will be implicated, and
the need for an independent court equipped to check the politi-
cal branches will be minimal. Similarly, the probability that the
executive or legislature will try to influence the judge's resolu-
tion of these cases is low, thus lessening the need for judicial
independence to assure impartial adjudication. While assigning
all diversity, admiralty, and bankruptcy-related litigation to leg-
islative courts may not actually give rise to the tyranny feared
by the framers,"" it is impossible to reconcile such a delegation
of adjudication with the framers' understanding of the scope of
the article III judicial power.180 Justice White's scheme is oblivi-
ous to the framers' separation of powers design, as it would al-
low much of the judicial power to be exercised by courts con-
trolled by the legislature or the executive. Justice White's
approach thus ignores the concentration of power in one branch,
so long as the congressional scheme accommodates the principle
of checks and balances.
While it is seriously deficient as a general approach to the
constitutionality of legislative courts, Justice White's balancing
concept may be useful in a more limited context. For example,
when it is unclear whether a dispute concerns matters within the
article III judicial power, such as cases within Justice Brennan's
"public rights" category that were not cognizable in 1789, Jus-
tice White's balancing scheme could provide a principled means
of determining whether these matters are assignable to legisla-
tive courts. Rather than automatically validating legislative
courts in the public rights area, Justice White's approach ex-
17 Many commentators have favored repealing the diversity grant, see, e.g., Mea-
dor, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.BZA J. 383 (1960);
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928), and
placing all such cases with state courts. Those who favor repeal often emphasize the
mundane, nonpolitical character of most diversity cases. One might also argue that diver-
sity cases could be adequately handled by legislative courts, as the government is not a
party and the likelihood of an institutional bias is small
1 Moreover, Justice White's scheme flies squarely in the face of Supreme Court
precedent that has upheld legislative courts only under very limited circumstances. See,
e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (judges of Court of Claims and of Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals are article I judges);CroweU v. Benson, 285 US. 22
(1932) (distinguishing between public and private rights cases); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (upholding legislative territorial courts).
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pressly requires a balancing of article III values against the gov-
ernment's interest in non-article III adjudication.181
D. Summary
Each of the major Marathon opinions fails to articulate and
apply the policy considerations that underlie the article III guar-
antees of judicial independence. Justice Brennan demonstrates
an awareness of the separation of powers concept, but largely
discounts the importance of checks and balances. Justice White,
on the other hand, stresses the role of the federal courts as a
check on the other branches of government, but is oblivious to
the separation of powers theory. To the extent these approaches
can be grafted together, they may compensate for each other's
deficiencies. But since neither analysis articulates fully the poli-
cies behind the article III requirements of judicial independence,
much less explores the ramifications of these policies, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court will integrate the approaches to
form a workable synthesis. Nevertheless, focusing on the distinct
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances is
necessary to develop a principled analysis that reconciles the ex-
istence of legislative courts with the constitutional requirement
of an independent judiciary.
V. POLmICAL RAMIFICATIONS
Despite Marathon's failure to provide clear guidelines re-
garding the permissibility of article I courts, the opinions
abound with political ramifications. Beneath the surface debate
lie implications that extend beyond the bankruptcy field, and
touch upon current proposals to restrict the jurisdiction of arti-
cle III courts.
The initial "political" surprise of the Marathon case was
the line-up of the Justices who concluded that the new bank-
ruptcy courts were unconstitutional; those generally regarded as
the Court's most liberal and most conservative members joined
forces to strike down the jurisdictional provision of the Code.'82
181 See notes 112-13 and accompanying text supra.
182 Justices Brennan and Marshall, two of the three remaining members of the lib-
eral Warren Court, were joined in the plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun, who has
been a frequent visitor to the liberal camp. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, § 6, at 22-23,
coL 1. Also joining in the plurality was Justice Stevens, who has been characterized as a
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Since Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor are particularly sensi-
tive to states' rights concerns, 83 and since their concurrence em-
phasized that Northern's claim arose solely under state law,
their views can be regarded as a demonstration of solicitude for
the prerogatives of states. In addition, Justice Rehnquist fre-
quently has criticized Congress for ignoring the constitutional
limits on the power of the federal government.18' Thus, his con-
clusion that the bankruptcy courts were unconstitutional might
be viewed as a negative response to a perceived general pattern
of congressional overreaching into matters of state law.
The rationale of the concurrence was not that Congress
must assign this type of action to the states for adjudication.
Rather, the concurring justices insisted that a federal court
hearing a claim such as Northern's must have all the protections
of judicial independence required by article H. Thus, the con-
currence considered it important to extend full federal protec-
tion to matters of state law. Perhaps this is the converse of the
federalism doctrine stressed by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor.185 Whereas federalism dictates that federal courts de-
fer to state courts in certain matters, the concurrence indicates
that when state law claims are adjudicated by federal courts,
they may only be litigated before those that are the most politi-
cally insulated. This treatment must be provided even though
some federal claims can be assigned to federal courts not safe-
guarded by the article I guarantees."'
gadfly who does not fall into either the liberal or the conservative group. On the other
hand, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, who formed the concurrence, have often been
described as politically conservative. Id. at 22, col. 2.
- See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (O'Connor, J.); National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
'" See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
185 "Our Federalism," as described by Justice Black in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971), is "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government... always
endeavors to [act] in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States." Id. Justice Rehnquist has often stressed that federalism requires that fed-
eral courts defer to state courts where possible. See, eg., Fair Assemment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See
O'Connor, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 Wh. & UAnY L REV. 599
(1981).
1" This is not to imply that the concurrence agreed with the plurality's explanation
of the public rights exception. The concurrence reserved judgment on the extent of this
exception, stating only that it did not apply to the dispute involved in Marathon. See
102 S. Ct. at 2881-82 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Intimations of federalism are missing from the plurality
opinion. Yet, in light of contemporary politics, it is even more
provocative. First, it is surprising that the plurality accorded
more protection to private rights than to public rights, despite
its explicit acknowledgement that threats to judicial indepen-
dence are greater in cases involving public rights.187 This posi-
tion indicates that private disputes are more important than
those between an individual and the government. It also indi-
cates that an individual challenging the government is less in
need of safeguards to ensure fair adjudication than an individual
challenging a private party. Given the well-recognized power and
resources of the federal government, the heightened protection
for private rights is a surprising position for the liberal wing of
the Court to embrace.
While the plurality appears at first glance to voice a tradi-
tional disapproval of a government scheme that fails to provide
sufficient procedural safeguards to protect individual rights, the
facts belie this view. Marathon arose in a commercial setting
with the equities fairly evenly balanced between two corpora-
tions. Furthermore, future cases presenting the same issue are
most likely to arise in a similar context. Thus, it is unlikely that
the Marathon dispute elicited the traditional liberal solicitude
for individual rights.
In light of Marathon's commercial setting, the recognized
crisis in the old bankruptcy system, 8 the persistent lack of in-
terest in bankruptcy matters displayed by the federal district
courts,189 and the absence of partisan debate over the establish-
ment of the new bankruptcy courts,1 90 the plurality's unwilling-
ness to uphold the changes in bankruptcy jurisdiction is some-
what puzzling. It suggests that, in addition to surface
considerations, the plurality may have been influenced by a de-
sire to send Congress a political message. By narrowly defining
the circumstances in which Congress may establish legislative
courts, the plurality may have sought to remind Congress that
the Court will be the ultimate arbiter of Congress' efforts to con-
trol federal court jurisdiction. Since Congress is considering sev-
187 See id. at 2870 n.20.
1 See id. at 2895 & n.16.
See id. at 2895.
,90 See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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eral bills that would curtail the jurisdiction of article III
courts,191 such a signal would be especially timely. Although
there have been perennial attempts to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, 12 the proposals generally have been relegated
to the backburner. This is no longer the case. Restrictions on
federal court jurisdiction are a prominent part of the "New
Right" social agenda; additionally, the main thrust of the "New
Federalism," a major theme of contemporary political rhetoric,
is that federal power should be restrained while the power of the
states should be expanded. Facing this political climate, the
Marathon plurality may well have intended its decision to be a
signal to Congress that attempts to limit federal court jurisdic-
tion will not be looked upon favorably.
If this interpretation of the plurality opinion is on the mark,
a corresponding explanation of the dissenting opinion should be
attempted. In contrast to the plurality approach, the dissenters
expressly counseled deference to congressional judgments in this
area,1 93 emphasizing that Congress has legitimate interests in
regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts. They also
stressed that Congress has the power to withdraw all bankruptcy
matters from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' While the
dissenters did not discuss the source of and limitations on Con-
gress' power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
their analysis indicates that Congress has unfettered power to
remove the authority of the lower federal courts to adjudicate
certain types of controversies.
This position finds ready support in article III, which grants
Congress the power to create any federal courts inferior to the
Supreme- Court.19 5 Based on this express constitutional grant,
Congress arguably has complete authority not only to abolish
the lower federal courts, but also to do so partially by limiting
191 See note 16 supra. The proposed legislation generally seeks to remove from the
federal courts to the state courts the power to adjudicate controversies raising certain
emotionally charged social issues. Because the legislation does not contemplate that ju-
risdiction will be vested in legislative courts, but in state courts, the relevance of Mara-
thon to the Court's view on these matters is indirect.
-2 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPom0 & H. WECHSLER, HAmr AND WECuLER'S
THE FEDERAL CouRTs AmD Tm FEDERAL SYsTm 309-65 (2d ed. 1973).
193 See 102 S. Ct. at 2895-96.
19 See id. at 2984.
195 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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their jurisdiction over certain types of disputes."' 6 This reason-
ing does not extend to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, how-
ever, because the consitutional grant of jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court is self-executing. 19 7  Nevertheless, since the
Constitution grants Congress power to make exceptions to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, 1 8 Congress may have significant
authority to limit the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion.199 While the dissenters in Marathon did not attempt an
exegesis of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction,
by emphasizing that Congress may grant and withdraw the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and that pragmatic
factors properly may influence its decisions, the dissenters con-
veyed the message that the Constitution imposes only minimal
restraints on Congress in this sphere.
CONCLUSION
The immediate impact of Marathon was to derail Congress'
efforts to revamp the bankruptcy system and to throw the world
of bankruptcy litigation into turmoil, but its political ramifica-
tions may extend much further. Although the Marathon opin-
ions fail to articulate an acceptable resolution of the constitu-
tional problems surrounding legislative courts, the subtext of
these opinions may greatly illuminate the views of the members
of the Court regarding a variety of proposals to curtail the juris-
diction of the article III federal courts. Marathon thus may be a
harbinger of important future decisions governing congressional
control over federal court jurisdiction.
I" See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 411 (1850). This view is supported by many
scholars. M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 21-24.
29 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 provides: "The judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme Court...
198 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
,,9 See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); M. REDISH, supra note 1,
at 17-21.
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